New Atheism’s Wardrobe Malfunction

Print Friendly, PDF & Email

But he thought, “This procession has got to go on.” So he walked more proudly than ever, as his noblemen held high the train that wasn’t there at all.”

Given the nature of the New Atheists’ attack on religious belief, it is not surprising that they have come in for a lot of criticism. In one of the more irenical books which discusses the New Atheism, professor of divinity at the University of Edinburgh David Fergusson writes:

..the rhetoric employed by the new atheists is often as
hostile and shrill as those of the most vehement religionists … the recent criticism of religion is at times too rabid and disabling of patient and constructive debate.”

One of the key criticisms of the new atheists by John Haught, a professor of theology at Georgetown University, is expressed as follows:

Their understanding of religious faith remains consistently at the same unscholarly level as the unreflective, superstitious, and literalist religiosity of those they criticize.”

In his scathing review of Dawkins’ The God Delusion in the London Review of Books, Terry Eagleton, professor of English literature at Manchester University, asks us to:

Imagine someone holding forth on biology whose only knowledge of the subject is the Book of British Birds, and you have a rough idea of what it feels like to read Richard Dawkins on theology. ”

Eagleton later describes Dawkins as “theologically illiterate”. Philosopher professor Michael Ruse from Florida State University, an atheist, condemns the New Atheists in the strongest of terms:

But I think first that these people do a disservice to scholarship. Their treatment of the religious viewpoint is pathetic to the point of non-being. Richard Dawkins in The God Delusion would fail any introductory philosophy or religion course. Proudly he criticizes that whereof he knows nothing. As I have said elsewhere, for the first time in my life, I felt sorry for the ontological argument. If we criticized gene theory with as little knowledge as Dawkins has of religion and philosophy, he would be rightly indignant. … Conversely, I am indignant at the poor quality of the argumentation in Dawkins, Dennett, Hitchens, and all of the others in that group. … I have written elsewhere that The God Delusion makes me ashamed to be an atheist. Let me say that again. Let me say also that I am proud to be the focus of the invective of the new atheists. They are a bloody disaster and I want to be on the front line of those who say so. ”

It is worth noting that the authors quoted above are not merely drawing attention to the ridicule and mockery in the writings of the New Atheists, but to their lack of understanding of the very subject they are criticising and their poor scholarship in general. Perhaps worst of all is the charge that their approach is just like the extreme forms of religion of which they are so critical.

One response made by Dawkins is that you do not need to study up on leprechology in order to disbelieve in leprechauns. A similar response, which has gained a lot of popularity in New Atheist circles, is due to P. Z. Myers, a professor of biology at the University of Minnesota and author of the popular atheist blog Pharyngula. It is known as the Courtier’s Reply and is intended to follow on at the end of the fable of the Emperor’s New Clothes. Theology is the Emperor, Dawkins the little boy and theologians the courtiers. It is quoted in part below:

I have considered the impudent accusations of Mr Dawkins with exasperation at his lack of serious scholarship. He has apparently not read the detailed discourses of Count Roderigo of Seville on the exquisite and exotic leathers of the Emperor’s boots, nor does he give a moment’s consideration to Bellini’s masterwork, On the Luminescence of the Emperor’s Feathered Hat. We have entire schools dedicated to writing learned treatises on the beauty of the Emperor’s raiment, and every major newspaper runs a section dedicated to imperial fashion; Dawkins cavalierly dismisses them all. … Dawkins arrogantly ignores all these deep philosophical ponderings to crudely accuse the Emperor of nudity. … Until Dawkins has trained in the shops of Paris and Milan, until he has learned to tell the difference between a ruffled flounce and a puffy pantaloon, we should all pretend he has not spoken out against the Emperor’s taste. ”

This is wonderful as a piece of rhetoric, but will it really do as a response? Can it be used to excuse the New Atheists’ lack of knowledge of theology and the inadequate engagement with arguments for the existence of God? In an article which criticises Dawkins’ argument that God almost certainly does not exist, but defends an atheistic position, philosopher Erik Wielenberg states why he is not impressed with the Courtier’s Reply. He writes:

I do not know exactly how much theology one needs to know to disprove the existence of God, but one needs to know at least enough theology to understand the various widely-held conceptions of God. In general, in order to argue effectively against a given hypothesis, one needs to know enough to characterize that hypothesis accurately. Furthermore, if one intends to disprove God’s existence, it is hardly reasonable to dismiss criticisms of one’s putative disproof on the grounds that God doesn’t exist anyway.”

Essentially, the idea behind the Courtier’s Reply is that it is obvious (or should be to any rational person) that there is no basis for belief in God, just as it is obvious that the Emperor has no clothes. But as we saw earlier in the context of Dawkins’ references to the Tooth Fairy, it is not at all obvious that there is no basis for belief in God. And even if the New Atheists think otherwise, they cannot sensibly base their arguments on such an idea on pain of circularity.

My contention is that the situation is almost precisely the opposite of that which Myers describes. It is the New Atheism which is the Emperor. The various critics, both theists and atheists, represent the little boy who points out that the Emperor has no clothes. But what is the Emperor to do? The last sentence of the original version provides the answer:

But he thought, “This procession has got to go on.” So he walked more proudly than ever, as his noblemen held high the train that wasn’t there at all.”

Despite numerous criticisms of their arguments, there does not seem to be any recognition among the New Atheists or their followers that their arguments do not work. Admitting this would not necessarily mean admitting atheism is false – there are plenty of atheists who do not subscribe to the New Atheism – but it isn’t just about winning arguments. The New Atheism is a programme to marginalise religion and so the procession must continue, with the New Atheists walking ‘more proudly than ever’.

There are a couple of key differences between Myers’ version and mine. Unlike Myers I am not claiming that it is obvious the New Atheists’ arguments are unsuccessful. It is necessary to understand their arguments properly and the objections to them before it becomes clear that this is the case. And since the New Atheism continues to find much support, those of us who think it is unsuccessful need to keep trying to show just where it goes wrong. Another difference is that Myers’ view seems to presuppose that all versions of theism are obviously without any rational basis, whereas my focus is on the New Atheism rather than atheism in general.

 

Extracted from Atheism’s New Clothes by David Glass (Apollos:2012) Click here  for more information about the book. 

 

 

i) David Fergusson, Faith and its Critics: a Conversation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009),11-12.

ii) John F. Haught, God and the New Atheism: a critical response to Dawkins, Harris and Hitchens (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), xiii.

iii) Terry Eagleton, ‘Lunging, Flailing, Mispunching’, London Review of Books (19 October, 2006).

iv)  From the blog Science and the Sacred, (retrieved: 30/10/10)

v) See Dawkins’ website, http://richarddawkins.net/articles/1647?page=27 (last accessed: 30/10/10).

vi) From Myers’ blog Pharyngula, (retrieved: 30/10/10).

vii) Erik Wielenberg, ‘Dawkins’s Gambit, Hume’s Aroma, and God’s Simplicity’, Philosophia Christi, 11 (2009), 113-128.

 

Posted in Quick Thoughts | Comments Off on New Atheism’s Wardrobe Malfunction

What is the Fine Tuning Argument? 12 Quick Points

Print Friendly, PDF & Email

1) Scientists have increasingly become aware that the universe is ‘just right’ for life. If any one of a number of features of the universe had been even slightly different, life as we know it would be impossible.

2) For example, various features of the universe are ‘just right’ for the existence of stars, galaxies and life itself; had they been slightly different the human race could not exist. Had the ratio of the electromagnetic and gravitational forces differed by about  1 part in ten thousand billion billion billion billion then stars such as the Sun, which are capable of supporting life, could not exist.

3) If the strong nuclear force been weaker this could have resulted in the instability of elements necessary for carbon-based life, while if it had been stronger this could have had a negative impact on the production of carbon and oxygen. The existence of hydrogen is sensitive to the strength of the weak nuclear force. A decrease in the weak force would mean that there would be no hydrogen burning stars like the Sun.

4) Theism provides a very neat explanation for this fine-tuning. Fine-tuning is an example of the sort of order we’d expect to find in a universe created by God. God would have reason to bring about valuable things, like a community of embodied moral agents. We must compare God’s reasons for creating a fine-tuned universe with the absence of any reason for a finely tuned universe given atheism. Such a complex and valuable state of affairs is much, much more likely given theism than chance.

5) Some have objected that theism doesn’t provide a good explanation because we don’t know what sort of universe God would want to create. However, God and humans would have certain properties in common. Both are rational, both are agents, and -unless we wish to embrace moral scepticism – we should acknowledge that both would recognise similar values. We also know from observation and our own direct experience that rational agents bring about complex states of affairs that are ordered for some purpose (eg. machines) or that bring about some value (eg art). The complexity of our universe brings about great beauty and life is a valuable state of affairs. So fine-tuning seems much more likely given theism.

6) Some object that theism doesn’t provide a mechanism to explain how fine-tuning came about. However, many good explanations don’t provide a mechanism. Isaac Newton’s theory of gravity, for example, provided powerful explanations of planetary motion even though there was much disagreement about the mechanism by which one massive body exerted a force on another. The same applies in quantum theory; no-one really knows what’s going on, but quantum theory certainly explains a lot!

7) Some have objected that fine-tuning does not require an explanation. After all, if there was not a finely-tuned universe we couldn’t exist. And if we didn’t exist, no one would be around marvel at all the complex order in the universe. So, maybe we shouldn’t be surprised to discover that our universe has been finely-tuned; if it didn’t we wouldn’t be here to observe it!  But this confuses two very different ideas. It confuses sentence (A) If human observers exist, it is inevitable that they will observe an ordered universe with sentence (B) it is inevitable that human observers exist. (A) is a rational belief, but (B) seems very implausible. Given all the ways our universe could have turned out, our existence seems extremely unlikely.

8 ) Yet another objection is to say that our universe is just one of many universes comprising a multiverse. This “multiverse hypothesis” requires sufficiently many universes with different physical constants so as to almost guarantee that at least one universe would be suitable for life. The idea is that all of these universes have different values for the constants and since there are so many of them (perhaps infinitely many) some happen to be suitable for life just by chance. Some prefer the multiverse hypothesis to theism because it seems more scientific. Yet it is difficult to see how we could observe or detect such multiverses.

9)   Even if a multiverse theory eventually explained certain experimental results well, this could be outweighed by its much greater complexity. Consider, for example, Max Tegmark’s proposal that everything which can happen does happen somewhere in the multiverse. This means that there are multiple copies of you; in some universes you are taller, in some shorter, in some fatter, in some thinner, in some you are Prime Minister, in some you are the richest person on the planet.  It’s difficult to think of a more complex, extravagant, counter-intuitive, theory.

10) Furthermore, even if a theory that was supported by evidence predicted a multiverse, we might wonder whether there is a simpler single-universe theory that can account for all the evidence without having to appeal to multiple universes. In that case, we might be tempted to accept the successful theory as a working hypothesis while remaining agnostic about its more extravagant claims.

11)  Robin Collins points out that large, non-fine-tuned universes in a multiverse will contain “little islands of order” that assemble purely by chance. Many of these islands will have observers that have also assembled by chance. A multiverse will contain many such observers in its non-fine-tuned regions. In fact, in a multiverse there would be many more observers in the “little islands of order” than there are  in our own finely tuned universe. So, the multiverse theory predicts observers both in finely-tuned regions and in some non-finely tuned regions. Indeed, most observers will exist in regions which have not been finely tuned.

However, such “little islands” of order would not exist for very long, and would be surrounded by an ocean of disorder. That’s not what we observe. We live in community of other rational observers (humans) with other embodied beings (animals) in a cosmos of exquisite beauty and order. These are not the observations that the multiverse theory would predict –  it is much more likely that we would observe a “little island” of order and an ocean of disorder on the multiverse theory. So our observations confirm design over the “multiverse hypothesis”.

12) Remember, a”multiverse hypothesis” requires sufficiently many universes with different physical constants so as to almost guarantee that at least one universe would be suitable for life. This being so, a multiverse would just push design back to the level of the multiverse itself ; it would raise the question of how the multiverse came about in such a way as to make life inevitable. There are a number of reasons for thinking that such a multiverse would be more probable given design. One reason is that inflation theory,  at present is a key component of favoured mechanisms for generating multiple universes, seems to require fine-tuning.

Robin Collins argues that the inflationary multiverse scenario requires a number of components to be in place, without any one of which it would still almost certainly fail to produce a single life-sustaining universe . These components are a mechanism to supply the energy needed for the bubble universes (the inflaton field), a mechanism to form the bubble universes, a mechanism to convert the energy of the inflaton field to normal mass / energy, and a mechanism that allows enough variation among the universes. In addition, he argues that appropriate background laws, such as gravity, and physical principles, such as the Pauli exclusion principle, would need to be in place to support life.

Posted in Existence of God, Quick Thoughts, Science and Christianity | Tagged , , , , , | Comments Off on What is the Fine Tuning Argument? 12 Quick Points